From cockroaches to human beings, the presence of other members of the same species typically facilitates dominant (habitual/well-learned) responses regardless of their contextual relevance. This social facilitation requires special attention in animal species such as primates, given their evolved cognitive control mechanisms. Here we tested baboons who freely engaged in (computer-based) conflict response tasks requiring cognitive control for successful performance, and discovered that social presence does not only enhance dominant responses but also consumes cognitive control resources. Under social presence, the baboons experienced greater cognitive conflicts, were less able to inhibit a learned action in favor of a new one, and were also less able to take advantage of previous experience with response conflict, compared with isolation. These findings explain why inappropriate behaviors are not easily suppressed in primates acting in social contexts, and indicate a greater demand for cognitive control in social groups. This extra demand might represent a major evolutionary drive of human intelligence.
In many animal species, the presence of conspecifics (either observers or coactors) improves performance on easy or welllearned tasks and impairs performance on difficult or poorly learned tasks; two phenomena traditionally referred to as social facilitation/impairment (SFI) effects (Guerin, 2009; Zajonc, 1965) .
According to Zajonc's (1965) classic view of SFI effects, the presence of others increases drive (conceived as physiological arousal) and the emission of dominant responses (those with the greatest habit strength), which are considered to be correct on easy tasks and incorrect on difficult tasks. This hypothesis has found support in many studies using very different species (Guerin, 2009) , whose dominant responses-whether correct or incorrectincreased under social presence conditions, compared to isolation. Although rival hypotheses were also supported in humans (Baron, 1986; Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Bond & Titus, 1983; Geen & Gange, 1977) , the energizing of dominant behaviors by the presence of others remains the most common interpretation of SFI effects in all considered species.
Here, we address an issue that has gone unnoticed so far: The dominant response hypothesis is plausible if the animal species lacks-or has very limited-control mechanisms that may counteract dominant responses when needed. It however seems too simple in the case of primates, who benefit from evolved executive functions such as cognitive flexibility and top-down inhibitory control (Bonté, Flemming, & Fagot, 2011; Engle, 2002; Miller, 2000) . We suggest that, in species such as primates, social presence may not only enhance dominant responses but may also consume cognitive control resources.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the enhancement of dominant responses in humans seems especially likely when the presence of others is distracting for some reasons (e.g., when others are unpredictable and elicit social monitoring, or are a source of reinforcements and punishments), thereby creating attentional conflicts when paying attention to others is incompatible with task demands (Baron, 1986; Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, & Dumas, 1999; Sharma, Booth, Brown, & Huguet, 2010) . Under these circumstances, the presence of others may consume the same cognitive control resources as those required for the suppression of incorrect dominant responses. However, whether social presence can simultaneously increase dominant responses and impair cognitive control processes remains unanswered both in human and nonhuman primates. Nonhuman research actually left open the nature of SFI effects on cognition (little has been done which can be explicitly attributed to SFI effects), perhaps because of the difficulty of measuring cognitive processes in animals under social presence condition. The present study overcomes these previous limitations due to a truly innovative setting allowing the study of cognitive control in coacting baboons.
Baboons live in harems comprising one or several males with their females and offsprings, and these harems agregate at sleeping site to form larger multimale multifemale troops of several hundreds of individuals. Baboons are therefore inherently social primates and therefore the perfect primate species to assess social influences on cognition. Furthermore, the behavior, adaptation, and socioecology of baboons have long been recognized as relevant for understanding human evolution (Patzelt, Zinner, Fickenscher, Diedhiou, Camara, Stahl & Fischer, 2011; Swedell & Plummer, 2012) . Baboon species are organized into hierarchical social networks in which individuals are connected at multiple levels. This organization, which also characterizes both Western industrialized societies and modern hunter-gatherers (Foley & Gamble, 2009; Hamilton, Milne, Walker, Burger & Brown, 2007) , suggests that baboons-like humans-actually need many control mechanisms in their social environment. Determining whether, how, and to what extent the presence of conspecifics influences cognitive control in primates species such as baboons therefore represents an important endeavor.
Method

Participants and Procedure
The study was conducted on 11 Guinea baboons (Papio papio; 7 males and 4 females; mean age ϭ 5.72 years, SD ϭ 1.71, age range: 3-9) from a larger social group (see their living conditions in Fagot & Paleressompoulle, 2009; Fagot & Bonté, 2010 ; see also Supplemental Text S1). We chose this group of baboons both because of their social qualities (Marzouki, Gullstrand, Goujon, & Fagot, 2014) and because of their familiarity with the present computer controlled operant conditioning setups (allowing a sound measure of cognitive control, see below), two major selection criteria for the present research. The fact that our baboon participants were familiar with the computer controlled operant conditioning setups indeed allowed reliable estimates of social presence effects on cognitive control based on tens of thousands of trials (at the group level), which would be extremely difficult if not impossible with other animals including humans.
In our study, baboons had free access from their enclosure to two series of five computer controlled operant conditioning setups with touch screens located within chambers fitted with clear Perspex side walls. Each baboon was equipped with a RFID microchip, allowing an automatic identification of the subject by the test computers. Each trial began with the display of either a pink circle or a purple hexagon in the central bottom part of the screen. Touching this sample stimulus triggered the immediate display of a gray cross and a light blue square that served as response stimuli (Supplemental Text S2) . To obtain a food reward, the monkey had to touch the cross stimulus when the sample was the circle or the square shape in case of the hexagon. Incorrect responses produced a three second time-out. During training trials, the cross was always presented on the left side of the response screen and the square on the right. Baboons received blocks of 100 trials only containing training trials and a balanced choice of sample stimuli, until they correctly performed at 80% or more in three successive blocks, indicating the formation of a correct dominant response (Fagot & Bonté, 2010) . After training, they continually received blocks of 100 trials consisting of 80 training (nonconflict) trials requiring the emission of the dominant response mixed with 20 probe (conflict) trials where the left/right location of the two response stimuli was reversed ( Figure 1A ). The conflict trials, therefore, required response control for a correct response to occur. As it is generally the case with tasks in which a dominant response tendency may interfere with the correct response, the difference in reaction time (RT) between the conflict and nonconflict trials-typically indicating longer RT on conflict trials relative to nonconflict trials-can be taken as evidence of a response conflict effect (hereafter simply referred to as "conflict effect") whose expression depends heavily on cognitive control resources (Engle, 2002) . As testing occurred without capture, the social context varied spontaneously during testing. Thus, on some trials, the baboons used the computers with no conspecific nearby, whereas on other trials one or more animals were present in the other test systems. Baboons could see other conspecifics (when present) using the other test computers, although the design of the test chamber prevented vision of their touch screen, and therefore other baboons' responses to the tests. This innovative procedure permitted measures of social presence effects with no need to remove the individuals from their social group to measure performance in the control (alone) condition. Any bias associated with the stress of social This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
deprivation (Cacioppo, Hawkley, Norman, & Berntson, 2011) was therefore eliminated in our setting, which is generally not the case in SFI studies (Guerin, 2009; Dindo, Whiten, & de Waal, 2009 ).
Expectations
In conflict tasks, the top-down control of automatic or dominant response tendencies takes time to build-up (see Ridderinkhof, 2002; Stins, Polderman, Boomsma, & de Geus, 2007; Van Den Wildenberg et al., 2010) . The interference (reflected by the conflict effect) associated with such tendencies is therefore typically stabilized on the longer responses, unless the individuals experience insufficient control resources for some reasons (as demonstrated in Parkinson's disease patients by Wylie, Ridderinkhof, Bashore, & van den Wildenberg, 2010) . Assuming that the presence of others consumes the same cognitive control resources as those required for the control of incorrect dominant responses, this benefit (stabilization of interference on longer responses) should be lost under social presence. Likewise, conditional accuracy functions (accuracy as a function of response speed) show that response accuracy for conflict trials dips below chance for the trials with the fastest RTs (associated with a tendency to make impulsive errors) but rises sharply toward asymptote for longer responses, indicating that the interference is stabilized in the slower segment of the RT distribution . The benefit of longer responses in terms of response accuracy should also be lost in the presence of others if this presence consumes cognitive control resources. Finally, there is evidence based on sequential trial effects (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) that primates (at least humans) can benefit from previous experience with cognitive conflict: RTs in conflict trials that are immediately preceded by conflict trials are typically shorter than those that are immediately preceded by nonconflict trials, indicating top-down trial-to-trial adjustments in cognitive control (Notebaert & Verguts, 2007; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinik, 2005) . Again, if the presence of others consumes cognitive control resources, these adjustments requiring time to build up (therefore more likely on the longer responses) should be more difficult if not impossible under social presence condition. Note that our expectations imply taking into account the distribution of RTs, and so the temporal dynamics of action control .
Results
A total of 86,262 trials were collected at the group level, with only 3% outlier trials (RT greater than 3 SD above individual mean RTs), leaving 83,677 valid trials for further analyses including 66,888 nonconflict trials and 16,789 conflict trials. This very large dataset was permitted by the automatic test procedure and the baboons' willingness to participate to our research. These data were examined in 2 (Trial Type: Nonconflict Trials, Conflict Trials) ϫ 4 (Social Presence Condition: 0, 1, 2, 3 or more neighbors) ϫ 5 (RT Bins) repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with RT bins based on a standard "delta-plot" procedure (e.g., Van Den Wildenberg et al, 2010) . To this end, the RTs of all correct responses were rank ordered for each baboon in each trial type and social presence condition, and then divided into five equal-size speed bins (quintiles). For each baboon, a mean RT was then determined for each quintile in each condition. "Delta" values (RT to conflict trials minus RT to nonconflict trials) were then determined for each quintile in each social presence condition. Finally, these values were plotted as a function of the mean RT of conflict and nonconflict trials taken together (i.e., response speed averaged across trial types; see Figure 1B ). Thus, our analyses allowed a computation of the RT difference between the conflict and nonconflict trials (conflict effect or delta value) as a function of response speed, and so a computation of the effects of our fixed factors (trial type, social presence) on different segments of the RT distribution (Supplemental Text S3 describes our syntax for computing the RT Bins). All analyses were conducted at the subject level with effect sizes provided at this level, not at the trial level (for skewness tests, see Supplemental Text S4).
Conflict Effect (Delta Plot Analysis)
The ANOVA on correct RTs showed a main effect of trial type, F(1, 10) ϭ 76.06, p Ͻ .000005, p 2 ϭ .88: RTs were longer for the conflict trials (M ϭ 651.50 ms, SD ϭ 27.36) than for the nonconflict trials (M ϭ 471.46 ms, SD ϭ 27.35), indicating a strong conflict effect (M ϭ 180.04 ms, SD ϭ 68.47). This analysis also showed a main effect of RT bins, F(4, 40) ϭ 386.30, p Ͻ .000001, p 2 ϭ .97; and all two-way interactions were significant (ps Ͻ .04; see Supplemental Table S1 ). More importantly, we found a reliable three-way interaction between trial type, social presence, and RT bins, F(12, 120) ϭ 5.22, p Ͻ .000001, p 2 ϭ .34 ( Figure 1B ). As expected, social presence did not change the magnitude of the conflict effect on the trials with the fastest RTs (Bin 1), but its impact increased dramatically on the trials with the longest RTs (Bin 5). On this critical segment of the RT distribution, baboons showed a much stronger conflict effect when they performed under social presence (Social Conditions 1, 2, Ն3 averaged: M ϭ 309.38 ms, SD ϭ 36.42) than when they performed alone (M ϭ 223.8 ms, SD ϭ 42.12), F(1, 10) ϭ 11.5, p Ͻ .007, p 2 ϭ .53; a remarkable pattern that also holds true for each baboon taken separately. Further analyses (same segment) showed that this stronger conflict effect is supported by a significant Trial Type ϫ Social Presence interaction, F(3, 30) ϭ 7.18, p Ͻ .0009, p 2 ϭ .42: Compared to isolation, social presence (three conditions averaged) reduced RT on the nonconflict trials (Ϫ62.09 ms), indicating a social facilitation of well-learned responses, whereas it increased RT (ϩ25 ms) on the conflict trials.
Of critical importance here, the presence of others increased the difference in RT between conflict and nonconflict trials, although it did not change response speed per se (no effect of social presence on RTs to conflict and nonconflict trials averaged, p Ͼ .38), indicating that social presence did not just distract attention but altered cognitive control. Further analyses revealed that the amplification of the conflict effect in the presence of others did depend on others' social rank, age, and sex. The conflict effect increased most notably when baboons performed in the presence of a dominant ( Figure 2A ) young ( Figure 2B ) male ( Figure 2C ) in the adjacent test setup (see Supplemental Text S5). This additional finding indicates that the characteristics of conspecifics-not just their presence-made a difference on baboons' cognitive control capacity. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Conditional Accuracy Functions
Additional evidence that social presence consumed cognitive control resources come from conditional accuracy functions (CAFs). A classical finding in humans is that responses for conflict trials dip below chance for the trials with the fastest RTs (where impulsive errors are likely) but rise sharply toward asymptote for longer responses, indicating the intervention of a top-down control mechanism that takes time to build-up (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Stins et al., 2007) . This effect was replicated in baboons when they performed their trials in isolation, but not, as expected, when they performed in the presence of others ( Figure 3A) . Bins of RT distribution for the CAF analysis were constructed from all responses (correct and incorrect) associated with conflict trials in each social presence condition. This analysis was restricted to the first 500 test trials (during which baboons were still unfamiliar with conflict trials), both because there were too few errors in the remaining trials and because the fastest baboon needed 500 trials to master the task at training.
As shown in Figure 3A , on the fastest RTs (Bin 1), the percentage of correct responses for the conflict trials were below chance in all conditions. For the longer responses (Bin 5), this percentage reached 71% in isolation (M ϭ 71.36%, SD ϭ 6.46%), whereas it remained at the chance level under social presence conditions (all social conditions averaged, M ϭ 50.08%, SD ϭ 8.80%). In the social conditions, therefore, participants' dominant yet incorrect response still occurred in half of the conflict trials. Accordingly, the effect of social presence was significant on the longest RTs (Bin 5), F(3, 30) ϭ 3.04, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .23, whereas it was not for the shortest RTs (Bin 1), F(3, 30) ϭ .87, p ϭ .46, p 2 ϭ .08. Thus, the baboons were clearly less able to inhibit a learned action in favor of a new one in the presence of others, compared with isolation, again only on the trials associated with longer RTs.
Sequential Trial Effects
Perhaps even more striking is what we found regarding sequential trial effects, again for the trials with the longest RTs (see Figure 3B ). There is evidence that humans can benefit from previous experience with cognitive conflict: RTs in conflict trials immediately preceded by conflict trials are typically shorter than those immediately preceded by nonconflict trials, indicating topdown adjustments in cognitive control (Gratton et al., 1992; Notebaert & Verguts, 2007; Ullsperger et al., 2005) . As expected, the baboons were capable of these adjustments throughout the task when they performed their trials in isolation, although they were unable to do so in the presence of others. For each baboon and each social presence condition, correct RTs were divided in four RT distributions resulting from the combination of Trial Type (conflict and nonconflict trials) ϫ Previous Trial Type (same vs. different trial from the following one). RTs in each distribution were again rank ordered and divided in five equal-sizes speed bins. The data were then analyzed as before (see results section on conflict effect) while integrating previous trial type (same vs. different trial from the following one).
1 This analysis revealed a four-way interaction between trial type, previous trial, social presence, and RT distribution, F(12, 120) ϭ 7.03, p Ͻ .00001, p 2 ϭ .41. Sequential trial effects occurred exclusively at the slowest segment of the RT distribution (Bin 5): When baboons performed their trials in isolation, their RT in conflict trials that were immediately preceded by conflict trials were clearly shorter (Ϫ82.00 ms) than those that were immediately preceded by nonconflict trials (M ϭ 975.09 ms, SD ϭ 53.17 ms vs. M ϭ 1,057.25 ms, SD ϭ 47.36 ms, respectively). On the contrary, when the baboons performed in the presence of others, their RT (three social conditions averaged) in the conflict trials that were immediately preceded by conflict trials were longer (ϩ80.18 ms) than those that were immediately preceded by nonconflict trials (M ϭ 1,135.01 ms, SD ϭ 23.86 and M ϭ 1,054.82 ms, SD ϭ 14.21, respectively). Thus, the sequential trial effects also indicated a significant impairment of cognitive control on the longest RTs under social presence conditions. Figure 2 . Conflict effect (delta) depending on the mean RT distribution (Bin 1 to 5) and Social presence condition: alone, with a "high-rank" or "low-rank" neighbor (A), alone, with a "young" or a "old" neighbor (B), and alone, with a male or a female (C). and nonconflict trials (blue lines) depending on the mean RT distribution (Bins 1 and 5), the type of n-1 trials (with "C" for conflict and "NC" for nonconflict trials), and number of coactors (0 to Ն3), with standard error of the mean. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Discussion
After more than a century of research on SFI effects, the relationship between social presence and cognitive control remained unexplored. The present research, conducted with baboons who freely engaged in (computed-based) response-conflict tasks, provides the first evidence that social presence may actually consume cognitive control resources. Under social presence, the baboons experienced greater interference from previously learned response tendencies, were less able to inhibit these tendencies in favor of new actions when necessary, and were also less able to engage in between-trial adjustments following response conflict, compared with isolation.
All these effects of social presence were restricted, as expected, to the slower segment (longer responses) of the RT distribution. This key feature of our findings indicates that the presence of others did not just divert attention away for the focal taskotherwise social presence would have not interacted with the RT distribution-but also consumed baboons' cognitive control resources. There is indeed evidence in conflict tasks that the topdown control of automatic or dominant response tendencies takes time to build-up and is therefore more likely on longer responses (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Stins et al., 2007; Van Den Wildenberg et al., 2010) , unless the individuals experience insufficient control resources for some reasons . The presence of conspecifics seems to be one of these reasons: What baboons were capable of (in terms of cognitive control) on the slower trials when performing alone disappeared in the presence of others. This finding can be taken as evidence that social presence interfered with cognitive control resources at the expense of the task at hand, and also indicates how important distributional analyses of RTs can be to determine both the nature and size of social presence effects. Since Bond and Titus (1983) , the magnitude of these effects is typically thought to be small. However, SFI research focused on mean or median RT (when any), which by concealing the temporal dynamics of behavior may lead to erroneous conclusions about effect sizes. Here, we show that social presence effects can be null at the fastest segment of the RT distribution and large at the slowest segment. These large effect sizes specifically located on the longer responses confirm that social presence interfered strongly with cognitive control. Consistent with our findings, there is evidence that a number of ape and monkey species are capable of-and engage spontaneously in-social cognitive processing such as monitoring, understanding, and predicting the behavior of others (Caldwell & Whiten, 2003; Cheney, Seyfarth, & Smuts, 1986; Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth, & Brosnan, 2011) , which may indeed shift a portion of cognitive control resources away from other activities. Of particular interest here, the conflict effect in isolation did not differ significantly from that found in the presence of lower rank animals, older animals, or females, whereas it increased dramatically in the presence of dominant young males who may require special monitoring (McNelis & Boatright-Horowitz, 1998; Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006) . This additional finding strengthens the view that the presence of conspecifics, although usual for social animals, may consume many of the executive resources necessary for successful adaptation to equally vital aspects of a changing environment. Furthermore, the fact that the characteristics of conspecifics-not just their presence per se-made a difference on the size of the conflict effect indicates that our findings are rooted, at least partially, in baboons' social life. This does not mean that our findings are specifically social. Other sources of distraction (physical or mechanical) may also undermine cognitive control, which however remains to be verified with the same kind of analyses as those used here. Such an effect based on nonsocial distractors would not make the present findings less interesting: The fact that social presence may interfere with cognitive control had never been demonstrated so far (the methods and analyses involved in previous SFI research did not allow any conclusion on cognitive control). Our findings could not be inferred either from the literature on cognitive control, in which social presence effects are still largely overlooked.
Thus, the present findings help us to understand why the presence of others typically impairs performance on difficult tasks relying heavily on cognitive control resources, and more generally why inappropriate behaviors are not easily suppressed under social presence conditions even in animals with evolved executive functions, such as nonhuman primates. Zajonc's (1965) classic hypothesis predicts that social presence facilitates dominant responses at the expense of subordinate ones but did not fully explain why this may also be the case in species with evolved control mechanisms. Our research indicating that social presence reduces the amount of control resources available offers an explanation. This explanation does not compete with Zajonc's hypothesis but clarifies why incorrect dominant responses may prevail under social presence even in species such as nonhuman primates.
Consistent with our approach, it seems that social presence also causes transitory deficits in executive functioning during neuropsychological testing in humans (Horwitz & McCaffrey, 2008; Wagstaff, Wheatcroft, Cole, Brunas-Wagstaff, Blackmore & Pilkington, 2008) . Our study shows that these socially induced deficits can be found much earlier in primate evolutionary development. The impact of social context on cognitive control was limited so far to factors specific to the human species, such as the threat of confirming negative stereotypes about one's group (e.g., Mazerolle, Régner, Morisset, Rigalleau, & Huguet, 2012; Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008) , or the perception of evaluative pressures (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Gimmig, Huguet, Caverni, & Cury, 2006) . Our study reveals how much cognitive control depends on elementary social factors such as the presence of conspecifics, the most fundamental invariant of behavior in many, if not all, animal species. This finding does not imply that the mechanisms underlying SFI effects in human and nonhuman primates are strictly the same. There is evidence that SFI effects in humans may also depend on whether the individuals perceive (or believe) they have sufficient resources to meet situational demands, a complex process relying on the interplay of affective states and self-related knowledge (Blascovich et al., 1999; Huguet, Dumas, & Monteil, 2004 ) that may be out of the scope of monkeys. Likewise, the nature of social presence effects may change substantially from one nonhuman primate species to another, depending on their social organization (Caine & Marra, 1988) , but this idea requires further research. Our findings also inform the growing literature on cognitive control: They point out that this ability may have evolved from phylogenetically old behavioral strategies such as the monitoring of conspecifics.
As such, the current findings are highly relevant for theories concerning the evolution of human intelligence (Dunbar, 1998;  This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007) . Dunbar (1998) proposed that human intelligence evolved as a means of surviving and reproducing in large and complex social groups, a "social brain hypothesis" supported by a positive relationship between neocortex size and group size in various mammal species (Reader & Laland, 2002) . Although living in a group might be adaptive due to increased survival, our study demonstrates that monitoring the presence of others reduces the amount of cognitive control resources that might otherwise be used for other activities. Living in groups is therefore also costly from an evolutionary standpoint. Accumulative evidence suggests that intelligence correlates with the efficiency of executive functioning (Brydges, Reid, Fox, & Anderson, 2012; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Engle, 2002) . Thus, we can speculate that the greater demand for executive resources in social groups was a selective pressure favoring enhanced cognitive control within the human lineage and was one of the major evolutionary drives leading to human intelligence.
